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THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE FOR IN-HOUSE
COUNSEL WHEN NEGOTIATING CONTRACTS: A RE-
SPONSE TO GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORP. V. GAF ROOFING
MANUFACTURING CORP.
Traditionally, corporate executives in need of legal advice
turned to private, outside law firms. Today, however, executives
increasingly are seeking legal advice from "corporate" or "in-
house" attorneys.' Studies estimate that ten percent of all prac-
ticing attorneys work for corporations.2 The work of these attor-
neys has changed significantly in recent years. They routinely
perform more substantive work, including litigation.' Corpora-
tions have found that in-house counsel can provide fast, effective
legal advice for less cost than outside law firms because an in-
house counsel has greater knowledge of the corporation and the
issues that it routinely faces.4
Corporations turn to in-house counsel, as they do with all at-
torneys, in part because of the assurance that the attorney-client
privilege will guard from public view communications between
attorneys and corporate executives.' For in-house counsel, how-
ever, defining and maintaining that privilege involves unique
risks and problems.' In-house counsel often perform dual roles,
acting as both executives and attorneys.' Additionally, attorneys
1. See Grace M. Giesel, The Business Client Is A Woman: The Effect of Women
As In-House Counsel on Women in Law Firms and the Legal Profession, 72 NEB. L.
REV. 760, 790-92 (1993) (describing the changing role of in-house counsels); Susan
Adams, Catch-22, FORBES, May 6, 1996, at 49.
2. See Thomas B. Metzloff, Ethical Consideration for the Corporate Legal Counsel,
in THE ROLE OF CORPORATE COUNSEL IN LITIGATION 109, 111 (ALI-ABA Course of
Study Materials No. C566, 1990).
3. See id.
4. See EVE SPANGLER, LAWYERS FOR HIRE: SALARIED PROFESSIONALS AT WORK 71
(1986) (estimating that the cost of legal work done in-house is 35% to 50% less than
the cost of comparable work referred out).
5. The privilege shields communications involving legal advice between attorneys
and their clients from the discovery process. See PAUL R. RICE, ATrORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 2:1 (1993).
6. See infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
7. See Scott R. Flucke, Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate
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without formal business duties often intermingle business advice
with legal advice.8 Although courts have held that the attorney-
client privilege does not protect business advice provided by an
attorney,9 these same courts have failed to articulate clearly
when the privilege protects communications containing mixed
legal and business advice.'0 Apart from vague generalities and
vacuous oracular statements," courts have failed to establish a
useful set of principles that would enable attorneys and clients
to determine when the attorney-client privilege will shield mixed
legal and business communications.' An in-house counsel's
plight is even more precarious because courts are reluctant to
presume that the attorney-client privilege will protect an in-
house counsel's communications-a presumption enjoyed by out-
side attorneys. 3 Given the difficulty defining what is a protect-
ed mixed business and legal discussion and the apparent judicial
prejudice against in-house counsel, corporations and their in-
house counsel confront great uncertainty about the scope of the
attorney-client privilege.
An effective evidentiary privilege cannot exist in a sea of uncer-
tainty. As then-Justice William Rehnquist stated in his majority
opinion in Upjohn Co. v. United States:'4 "An uncertain privilege,
or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying
applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at
all.""5 The uncertainty surrounding the attorney-client privilege
for in-house counsel threatens to vitiate the benefits of the privi-
lege for corporate clients and to lessen the benefits corporations
receive from maintaining in-house legal departments. 6
Setting: Counsel's Dual Role as Attorney and Executive, 62 UMKC L. REV. 549
(1994).
8. See Shira A. Scheindlin, LegallBusiness Advice Dichotomy, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 5,
1993, at 7.
9. See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2296-312 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
10. See RICE, supra note 5, § 7:6, at 508-10.
11. See id. § 7:9, at 522.
12. See id.
13. See In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (protecting communi-
cations of an in-house counsel "only upon a clear showing that [an in-house counsel]
gave [advice] in a professional legal capacity"); RICE, supra note 5, § 7:1.
14. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
15. Id. at 393.
16. See Grace M. Giesel, The Legal Advice Requirment of the Attorney-Client Privi-
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The uncertainty faced by in-house counsel was highlighted by
the Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. GAF Roofing Manufacturing
Corp.'7 decision. Georgia-Pacific held that the attorney-client
privilege did not apply to conversations between corporate offi-
cers and an in-house counsel who negotiated a complex envi-
ronmental liability provision of a commercial contract. 8 This
decision sent shock waves through the corporate legal communi-
ty,9 raising new concerns about an attorney's ability to serve
as a negotiator while retaining the protections of the attorney-
client privilege. 0
This Note examines the Georgia-Pacific decision and argues
that courts should adopt a new standard for determining when
the attorney-client privilege protects a mixed business and legal
discussion between a client and an in-house counsel serving as a
negotiator. After exploring the history and rationale for the at-
torney-client privilege,2' this Note identifies the unique prob-
lems faced by corporations and in-house counsel.22 This discus-
sion is followed by an outline of the decisions applying the attor-
ney-client privilege to corporations and in-house counsel.'
Next, this Note examines the role of the attorney-negotiator24
and focuses on the few cases that have applied the attorney-
client privilege in this context.' The next section discusses
Georgia-Pacific and its variance from established precedent,
lege: A Special Problem for In-House Counsel and Outside Attorneys Representing
Corporations, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1169, 1171-72 (1997).
17. No. 93 Civ. 5125 (RPP), 1996 WL 29392, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1996).
18. See id. at *5.
19. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 1, at 49; Kenneth J. Berke, Erosion of Attorney-
Client Privilege, ENVTL. COMPLIANCE & L1TIG. STRATEGY, Oct. 1996, at 5; Dual Role
Hurts: Contract Negotiator Loses Attorney-Client Privilege, CORP. COUNS., Feb. 1996, at
1; David G. Keyco, Privilege for Inside Counsel Communications: The Problem of Dual
Roles, INSIGHTS, July 1996, at 30; Claudia MacLachlan, Corporate Counsel Defend
Attorney-Client Privilege, NAT'L L.J., July 29, 1996, at B1; Lori Tripoli, Privilege Nar-
rows for In-House Counsel, ENVTL. COMPLIANCE & LITIG. STRATEGY, Feb. 1996, at 1.
20. See Berke, supra note 19, at 5 (arguing that the Georgia-Pacific decision "sin-
gle-handedly decimated the attorney-client privilege for communications between in-
house counsel and management during contract negotiations").
21. See infra notes 29-49 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 50-84 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 85-160 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 166-91 and accompanying text.
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arguing that the uncertainty evident in the decision beckons a
new legal standard.26 This Note concludes by articulating a new
test for determining when an attorney-negotiator should be
covered by the attorney-client privilege: the "significant amount"
standard. Because this new standard will provide certainty to
corporations and in-house counsel, it will better fulfill the policy
behind the corporate attorney-client privilege: encouraging cor-
porations to seek legal advice so that in-house counsel can prac-
tice "preventive law."'
THE HISTORY AND RATIONALE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest common law privi-
lege granting confidentiality to communications. 9 Commenta-
tors have traced the privilege's roots to the Roman Republic,"
and it was established firmly in Anglo jurisprudence by the
reign of Elizabeth I in the 1600s.3 The privilege shields com-
munications between a client and his attorney from discovery,
providing an environment within which a client can discuss
candidly his legal problems.32 Wigmore defined the privilege as
follows:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a profes-
sional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communi-
cations relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by
the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7)
from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except
the protection be waived."3
26. See infra notes 192-268 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 269-92 and accompanying text.
28. "Preventive law" entails providing advice to corporations so that they can
avoid legal disputes and regulatory infractions. See JOHN WILLIAM GERGACZ, ATtOR-
NEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE, J 1.03[1], at 1-9 (2d ed. 1990).
29. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
30. See Max Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer
and Client, 16 CAL. L. REV. 487, 487-88 (1928).
31. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2290.
32. See Thomas W. Hyland & Molly Hood Craig, Attorney-Client Privilege and
Work Product Doctrine in the Corporate Setting, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 553, 553 (1995).
33. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2292, at 554 (emphasis deleted).
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The privilege was based originally on "the oath and the honor
of the attorney" and the notion that the attorney as a gentleman
would not reveal the confidences of his clients.' By the eigh-
teenth century, the privilege had begun to fall out of favor be-
cause judges believed it was an impediment to the judicial
search for truth-a concern that lingers today.35
By the nineteenth century, the privilege regained vigor as
courts recognized its utilitarian benefits. 6 Wigmore suggested
that the privilege regained its lost prominence because the privi-
lege "promote[s] freedom of consultation of legal advisers by cli-
ents."37 The U.S. Supreme Court approved of the "encourage-
ment of open discussion" rationale in Upjohn, in which the
Court stated:
[The attorney-client privilege's] purpose is to encourage full
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients
and thereby promote broader public interests in the obser-
vance of law and administration of justice. The privilege rec-
ognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public
ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the
lawyer's being fully informed by the client.8
Although commentators and courts have recognized the theo-
retical benefits of the privilege for decades, the privilege is con-
strained by a tension between the more ephemeral goal of en-
couraging a free flow of information between client and attorney
and the very concrete impediments the privilege poses to the
discovery process.39 The benefits of the privilege are indirect,
but "its obstruction is plain and concrete."4" As one commenta-
tor notes: "a tension exists between the secrecy required to effec-
34. Id. § 2290, at 543; see also John E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of
the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 445-46 (1982) (dis-
cussing the historical background of and justifications for the privilege).
35. See Sexton, supra note 34, at 446.
36. See id.
37. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2291, at 545.
38. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
39. See Sexton, supra note 34, at 446.
40. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2291, at 554.
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tuate the privilege and the openness demanded by the fact-find-
ing process."4'
Nevertheless, the privilege itself does not hide facts from a
court; it only protects communications between an attorney and
a client.42 As the Supreme Court noted in Upjohn: "The privi-
lege only protects disclosure of communications; it does not pro-
tect disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communi-
cated with the attorney . . . ."4 The privilege may make a
court's discovery of relevant facts more cumbersome, but the
privilege does not forever shield the facts from the judge and
jury-it only requires more vigorous lawyering." As Justice
Jackson noted in his concurring opinion in Hickman v. Taylor:45
"Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to
perform its functions on wits borrowed from the adversary., 46
Courts have dealt unsuccessfully with the thorny task of strik-
ing a balance between clients' interest in confidential communi-
cations and the justice system's interest in full disclosure.47 As
John William Gergacz states in Attorney-Corporate Client Privi-
lege: "it is clear that too much information protected by the priv-
ilege doctrine will be an obstacle to justice; as will too great a
client risk of attorney disclosure."48 Owing to this uncertainty,
judges have been reluctant to expand the privilege, and
Wigmore encouraged courts to confine it to "the narrowest possi-
ble limits consistent with the logic of its principle."9
THE UNIQUE ROLE OF CORPORATIONS AND IN-HOUSE COUNSEL
When corporations have sought to enforce the privilege, courts
have been even more reluctant to shield communications from
the discovery process.0 A fundamental source of judicial ambiv-
41. Sexton, supra note 34, at 446.
42. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395.
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
46. Id. at 516 (Jackson, J., concurring).
47. See GERGACZ, supra note 28, 1.0411].
48. Id.
49. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2291, at 554.
50. See Giesel, supra note 16, at 1203-07.
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alence to protecting corporate-attorney communications is the
nature of corporations.51 They are inanimate, artificial entities
lacking human qualities respected by the legal system, such as
personal dignity and privacy.52 Chief Justice John Marshall's
classic definition of the corporation touches on this difference:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and
existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere crea-
ture of law, it possesses only those properties which the char-
ter of its creations confers upon it, either expressly, or as in-
cidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed
best calculated to effect the object for which it was created.
Among the most important are immortality, and, if the ex-
pression may be allowed, individuality.. .
A crucial difference between a corporation and a natural indi-
vidual arises in the context of confidentiality. A corporation has
many different avenues that can be used to communicate with
counsel, from management to line workers to outside advi-
sors.' Because a corporation is a creation of law, it cannot com-
municate directly with counsel. An individual, however, commu-
nicates directly with counsel.55 This difference renders the need
for confidentiality between counsel and the corporation less
convincing. Additionally, because so many people are involved in
corporations," there is a higher likelihood that a corporation
will lose an established privilege through waiver by one of its
many agents.57
An additional concern regarding the privilege's application to
corporations is the special ability of a corporation, as opposed to
an individual, to construct policies to keep information purposely
51. See Michael L. Waldman, Beyond Upjohn. The Attorney-Client Privilege in the
Corporate Context, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473, 475-76 (1987).
52. See id. at 475.
53. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636
(1819).
54. See Waldman, supra note 51, at 475-76.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 476.
57. For an extensive treatment of the waiver doctrine, see RICE, supra note 5,
§§ 9:1-9:94.
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and unnecessarily under the privilege.58 As one court noted: "in
the corporate context, given the large number of employees, fre-
quent dealings with lawyers and masses of documents, the 'zone
of silence grows large.'"59
The nature of corporate activities, however, makes access to
attorneys imperative. As the Supreme Court observed in
Upjohn: "In light of the vast and complicated array of regulatory
legislation confronting the modern corporation, corporations,
unlike most individuals, 'constantly go to lawyers to find out
how to obey the law."'60 This pressing corporate need for legal
advice has led some commentators to argue that corporations
have enough incentives to seek legal advice and, thus, do not
need the same protections from the attorney-client privilege.6
Fiduciary and statutory duties requiring management to keep
informed about activities within an organization and the duty to
avoid decisions that would subject the corporation to legal prob-
lems, it is argued, provide sufficient encouragement for corpo-
rate management to seek legal advice, irrespective of the confi-
dentiality protection provided by the attorney-client privilege.62
As if a corporation's ability to maintain the attorney-client
privilege was not difficult enough, the problems increase when a
corporation seeks to shield a communication with an in-house
counsel. In-house counsel often find themselves performing mul-
tiple roles, involving both legal and nonlegal matters." When
attorneys act in these dual roles, courts have great difficulty
distinguishing between activities that involve providing legal
advice and those that are grounded in the attorney's role as a
58. See Sexton, supra note 34, at 478.
59. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 432 N.E.2d 250, 256-57 (111. 1982)
(quoting David Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65
YALE L.J. 953, 955 (1956)).
60. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981) (quoting Bryson P.
Burnham, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Arena, 24 BUS. LAW. 901,
913 (1969)).
61. See Glen Weissenberger, Toward Precision in the Application of the Attorney-
Client Privilege for Corporations, 65 IOWA L. REV. 899, 902-06 (1980); Comment, At-
torney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 424, 427-29 (1970); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing
and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REV. 464, 473-77 (1977).
62. See GERGACZ, supra note 28, 1.04[1l[b][i].
63. See Flucke, supra note 7, at 549.
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business executive. 4 This ambiguity has created problems
maintaining the attorney-client privilege, but corporations have
nevertheless increased their use of in-house counsel for both le-
gal and business advice."
Beyond the concerns about in-house counsel providing both
business and legal advice, some judges have been reluctant to
apply the privilege to in-house counsel because they fear that in-
house counsel do not have the independence required to provide
balanced legal advice.6" As one commentator observes:
Not only must [the in-house lawyer] be sensitive to the inter-
est and activities of his employer, but he must take due ac-
count of the opinions and attitudes of his superiors ....
[Plermanent involvement with the activities of one firm and
direct dependence on this firm for their salary is thought to
lead in-house lawyers to identify themselves with the firm's
interests to the detriment of their independence ... .6
Concerns about the independence of in-house counsel, howev-
er, are misplaced. In many situations, outside counsel may be so
dependent upon an individual client that he is no more "inde-
pendent" than an in-house attorney.' Furthermore, the Model
64. See id.; Giesel, supra note 16, at 1171.
65. See SPANGLER, supra note 4, at 71; Adams, supra note 1, at 49; Scheindlin,
supra note 8, at 7.
66. In fact, the European Court of Justice, the European Community's highest ju-
dicial body, decided that in-house counsel would not be given the attorney-client
privilege primarily because of independence concerns. See Case 155/79, AM & S Eu-
rope Ltd. v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 1575, 1611. The court held that the attorney-
client privilege "emanate[s] from independent lawyers, that is to say, lawyers who
are not bound to the client by a relationship of employment." Id. For a discussion of
the AM & S case and the attorney-client privilege's application to in-house counsel
in the European Community, see Alison M. Hill, Note, A Problem of Privilege: In-
House Counsel and the Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States and the Euro-
pean Community, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INTL L. 145 (1995).
67. Theofanis Christoforou, Protection of Legal Privilege in EEC Competition Law:
The Imperfections of a Case, 9 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 16 (1985-86).
68. See Hill, supra note 66, at 189-90; Morris W. Hirsch, The Pendulum Swings
Back: General Dynamics and Other Signs of Changing Fortunes of In-House Counsel,
NEV. LAW., Mar. 1995, at 13, 15 ("hus, as a practical matter in this highly compet-
itive environment, law firms generally are more subject to pressure to conform to
the desires of individual employees (the more senior the employee, the greater the
pressure) than are in-house lawyers.").
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Rules of Professional Conduct do not differentiate between out-
side and inside counsel.69 In-house counsel are bound by the
same ethical constraints as an attorney at an "independent" law
firm.70 Additionally, in-house counsel have won suits for retal-
iatory discharge after being fired for providing undesirable ad-
vice to their supervisors.71 This newfound employment law pro-
tection for in-house counsel suggests that they have a high mea-
sure of independence from their employer regarding the content
of their legal advice. Despite these mitigating factors, which
should alleviate judges' concerns regarding the independence of
in-house counsel, courts have continued to give outside counsel
the presumption that their activities are legal in nature, while
denying that same presumption to in-house counsel. 2
Applying the attorney-client privilege to in-house counsel,
however, has significant benefits for both the corporation and
society."3 If the privilege did not apply to in-house counsel, cor-
porate officers would be less likely to consult, or even hire, in-
house counsel because, absent the privilege, in-house counsel
could become a repository of easily discoverable facts for oppos-
ing counsel. '4 As Gergacz states:
[The privilege] encourages intraorganizational candor by
making counsel a protected source for giving legal advice.
The basis for this candor is management's perception of the
value of legal advice and the realization that its costs will not
include creating a reservoir of information that would be
readily available to be used against the corporation.75
69. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT terminology (1995) (defining
[flirm" and "law firm" to encompass "the legal department of a corporation or other
organization").
70. See Hill, supra note 66, at 184.
71. See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994);
Sara A. Corello, Note, In-House Counsel's Right to Sue for Retaliatory Discharge, 92
COLUM. L. REv. 389, 402 (1992) (summarizing cases).
72. See RICE, supra note 5, § 7:1. For a discussion of the judicial bias against in-
house counsel, see Giesel, supra note 16, at 1206-15.
73. See GERGACZ, supra note 28, 1.0311].
74. See id. I 1.04[1][b][i].
75. Id. I 1.04[1][b][ii], at 1-16 to 1-17.
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As opposed to a confidential source of valuable legal advice pro-
vided at a low cost, an in-house counsel without the attorney-
client privilege would be a ticking time bomb waiting to explode
when the corporation is sued. 6 Opposing counsel would know
that they could discover information about all potential legal
conflicts by subpoenaing the in-house counsel because the privi-
lege would not protect information flowing through the general
counsel's office." Such a scenario brings to life Justice
Jackson's fear that "a learned profession [would] perform its
functions... on wits borrowed from the adversary.""8
The fiduciary and statutory duties of corporate officers and
directors provide some incentives for consulting with attor-
neys. 9 Absent the attorney-client privilege, however, the in-
house counsel likely would be viewed more as a litigation liabili-
ty than as an aid to business." The fiduciary incentives to seek
advice from in-house counsel nearly would be eliminated if the
corporation came to view the in-house counsel not as a useful
counselor, but as an organizational threat.8 '
Furthermore, applying the privilege to in-house counsel en-
courages these attorneys to provide their most socially valuable
activity: practicing preventive law.82 In-house counsel, given the
candor created by the attorney-client privilege, can help a corpo-
ration by reviewing business practices to make sure they comply
with the law and by ensuring that business transactions protect
a corporation's interests. 3 Absent the in-house counsel per-
forming these functions, regulatory infractions would be more
frequent and the interests of corporations would not be protected
adequately. Both of these results likely would cause corporations
to turn to an already strained judicial system to resolve their
disputes. If, however, the attorney-client privilege can enhance
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring); see su-
pra text accompanying note 46.
79. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
80. See GERGACZ, supra note 28, 91 1.04[1][b][i].
81. See id.
82. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
83. See GERGACZ, supra note 28, T1 1.0311], at 1-9.
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the ability of in-house counsel to perform preventive law, then
"fewer problems [will] arise for clients and the more efficiently
the legal system will operate."' The corporate attorney-client
privilege thus serves the vital role of preserving judicial resourc-
es, even when the in-house counsel navigates the dreary world
of corporate transactions, far removed from the likelihood of
pending litigation.
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE APPLIED TO CORPORATIONS
AND IN-HOUSE COUNSEL
Although the U.S. Supreme Court had, without much discus-
sion, applied the attorney-client privilege to a corporation in a
1915 opinion," the modern jurisprudence on the corporate attor-
ney-client privilege began in earnest with Judge Campbell's opin-
ion in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n. 6 Claiming
that no previous court had addressed the issue expressly, Judge
Campbell held that "a corporation is not entitled to make claim to
the [attorney-client] privilege." 7 Judge Campbell refused to ap-
ply the privilege to the corporation because, in his opinion, the
privilege was "fundamentally personal in nature."' He further
opined that the flow of information through the many avenues of
the corporate structure undermined the need to protect the confi-
dentiality of communications with attorneys. 9
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit unanimous-
ly reversed Judge Campbell's decision, holding that "[a] corpora-
84. Id.
85. See United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915).
The Court applied the privilege to a corporation and its outside lawyers, noting only
that:
The desirability of protecting confidential communications between attor-
ney and client as a matter of public policy is too well known and has
been too often recognized by text-books and courts to need extended com-
ment now. If such communications were required to be made the subject
of examination and publication, such enactment would be a practical pro-
hibition upon professional advice and assistance.
Id.
86. 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962), rev'd en banc, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963).
87. Id. at 773.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 773-74
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tion is entitled to the same treatment as any other 'cient'-no
more and no less."" Although the Seventh Circuit decisively re-
buked Judge Campbell, his opinion articulated many of the con-
cerns about applying the privilege to corporations, and modern
courts that restrict the corporate attorney-client privilege often
echo Judge Campbell's reasoning.9' His opinion prompted other
courts to reexamine the policies underlying the privilege, and his
refutation of the confidentiality rationale weakened the
privilege's justification in the corporate context.92 Despite the
rebuke from the Seventh Circuit, Judge Campbell's reasoning
has had "significant doctrinal consequences" on the development
of the corporate attorney-client privilege.9"
Once courts established that a corporate attorney-client privi-
lege existed, they grappled with what communications within a
corporation should be protected. During the 1960s and 1970s,
lower courts developed two tests to determine whether the privi-
lege covered a corporate officer's discussion with an attorney: the
"control group" test and the "subject matter" test.
The control group test was established in City ofPhiladelphia v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp.' At issue were interviews conducted
by the General Electric Company's general counsel in the course of
an internal investigation involving a pending indictment of the
corporation.95 The court rejected the analysis and holding of Unit-
ed States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,96 which extended the
attorney-client privilege to communications from every employee
to an in-house counsel.97 Relying heavily on Hickman v.
Taylor," the court focused its analysis on the communicating
employee's position within the company.99 As the court stated:
90. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 324 (7th Cir.
1963) (en bane).
91. See R. David White, Radiant Burners Still Radiating: Attorney-Client Privilege
for the Corporation, 23 S. TEY. L.J. 293, 294 (1982).
92. See Waldman, supra note 51, at 479-81.
93. Id. at 479.
94. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
95. See id. at 484.
96. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
97. See id. at 360.
98. 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (establishing the work-product doctrine).
99. See Westinghouse Elec., 210 F. Supp. at 485.
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[If the employee making the communication, of whatever
rank he may be, is in a position to control or even to take a
substantial part in a decision about any action which the cor-
poration may take upon the advice of the attorney, or if he is
an authorized member of a body or group which has that au-
thority, then, in effect, he is (or personifies) the corporation
when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer and the privilege
would apply."°
In the first application of the control group test, the court de-
clined to apply the privilege to communications between the gen-
eral counsel and the employees regarding answers to interroga-
tories.'' This new test ushered in an era of uncertainty be-
cause it required courts to determine who was in the control
group with regard to each decision.0 2 Making this determina-
tion proved difficult because the control group differed for each
corporation and, indeed, for each corporate decision.' As Paul
Rice states in Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States, the
"inherent ambiguity [of the definition of control group] ...
diminishe[d] the predictability that the application of the privi-
lege must have in order to effectively achieve its goal of encour-
aging open communications."" 4 Although courts criticized the
test for limiting the free flow of information to in-house counsel
and for its other flaws, before Upjohn most courts employed the
control group test.15
100. Id.
101. See id. at 486.
102. See RICE, supra note 5, § 4:13.
103. The Westinghouse Electric court noted that even a lower level employee such
as "the head of the Claims Department" might claim the privilege if he had the
power to act on advice without consulting the Board of Directors. Westinghouse Elec.,
210 F. Supp. at 486. Necessarily, the head of claims might have the privilege with
regard to some decisions, but not to others. The control group test would require the
in-house counsel to analyze the power structure for each management decision before
knowing whether a communication would receive the protection of the attorney-client
privilege. See RICE, supra note 5, § 4:13.
104. RICE, supra note 5, § 4:13, at 4-35.
105. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981); GERGACZ, supra
note 28, 3.02[3][a][i].
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The competing analysis was the subject matter test developed
in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker.' The dispute in
Harper & Row involved memoranda prepared by defense attor-
neys upon debriefing the defendant's employees and former em-
ployees after each had testified before a federal grand jury."7
The court summarily dismissed the control group test as "not
wholly adequate."'0 8 As an alternative to the control group test,
the court held that the privilege applied when
an employee of a corporation, though not a member of its
control group, is sufficiently identified with the corporation
so that his communication to the corporation's attorney is
privileged where the employee makes the communication at
the direction of his superiors in the corporation and where
the subject matter upon which the attorney's advice is
sought by the corporation and dealt with in the communi-
cation is the performance by the employee of the duties of
his employment."i
The subject matter test significantly expanded the attorney-cli-
ent privilege and improved upon the control group test because
it recognized that even low-level corporate employees could have
information important to the in-house counsel."0 Commenta-
tors and courts, however, feared that this test encouraged the
funneling of information to in-house counsel by corporate em-
ployees and could be used by a crafty corporation to shield rele-
vant information from the fact-finder."' Although other courts
modified and applied the subject matter approach, the test did
not receive universal acceptance."'
In Upjohn Co. v. United States,"' the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the split among the circuits regarding the scope of the
106. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), affd by an equally divided Court, 400 U.S. 348
(1971).
107. See id. at 490.
108. Id. at 491.
109. Id. at 491-92.
110. See GERGACZ, supra note 28, 3.02[3][a][ii].
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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corporate attorney-client privilege. The case arose because of
Upjohn's internal investigation of allegations that its officers
used bribes and kickbacks to secure contracts from foreign gov-
ernments."4 As part of this investigation, a questionnaire was
sent to "All Foreign General and Area Managers," over the
chairman of the board's signature, asking for detailed informa-
tion about any payments to foreign officials." 5 The question-
naires were returned directly to Upjohn's general counsel."6
The general counsel compiled a report on foreign payments and
sent it to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS).117 The IRS subsequently is-
sued a summons for the written questionnaires sent to the man-
agers, but Upjohn refused to provide them, claiming that the at-
torney-client privilege protected the documents." 8
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion explicitly rejected the
control group test."9 He observed that the privilege exists not
only for conversations that convey professional legal advice, but
also for those conversations that provide an attorney with the
information needed to render sound and informed counsel.2
The Court noted that an in-house counsel needs to gather infor-
mation from lower-level employees to give effective advice to
upper-level management. 2' Absent the protections of the attor-
ney-client privilege, lower-level employees would be reluctant to
provide information to counsel. 2 These factors led the Court
to reject the control group test, stating:
[The control group test] frustrates the very purpose of the
privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant in-
formation by employees of the client to attorneys seeking to
render legal advice to the client corporation .... The narrow
scope given the attorney-client privilege by the court below
114. See id. at 386.
115. See id. at 386-87.
116. See id. at 387.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 387-88.
119. See id. at 392-97.
120. See id. at 390.
121. See id. at 391.
122. See id. at 391-92.
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not only makes it difficult for corporate attorneys to formu-
late sound advice when their client is faced with a specific
legal problem but also threatens to limit the valuable efforts
of corporate counsel to ensure their client's compliance with
the law.'
The Court also faulted the control group test because it was
difficult to apply in practice.' Although no judicial standard
could decide the issue with "mathematical precision," Justice
Rehnquist noted that "if the purpose of the attorney-client privi-
lege is to be served, the attorney and client must be able to pre-
dict with some degree of certainty whether particular discus-
sions will be protected."' The search for certainty was a ma-
jor factor in the Court's rejection of the control group test.
The Court set as its goal the achievement of a certain and
easily applied rule," but it failed to add a needed dose of pre-
dictability to the application of the attorney-client privilege."
In the end, the Court held that the privilege covered the ques-
tionnaires" without explicitly adopting the subject matter
test.129 Instead, Justice Rehnquist stated: "We are acutely
aware, however, that we sit to decide concrete cases and not
abstract propositions of law. We decline to lay down a broad rule
or series of rules to govern all conceivable future questions in
this area, even were we able to do so."'
The Court's failure to articulate a standard for the corporate
attorney-client privilege prompted vigorous criticism. Chief Jus-
tice Burger's concurring opinion chastised the Court for failing
to meet its self-imposed goal of achieving certainty.' Addi-
123. Id. at 392.
124. See id. at 393.
125. Id.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 402-04 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); Jacqueline A. Weiss, Note, Beyond Upjohn: Achieving Certainty by Ex-
panding the Scope of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 50 FORnHA L. REV.
1182, 1184 (1982).
128. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396.
129. See id. at 392.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 402-04 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
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tionally, some have criticized the majority decision for failing to
explain properly the rationale behind the corporate attorney-
client privilege.'' Furthermore, commentators faulted Upjohn
for basing its holding on the assumption that companies will try
to voluntarily comply with the law, but not requiring voluntary
compliance with the law to receive the benefits of the privi-
lege. 13 3 The privilege thus extends to situations in which this
underlying assumption is not valid, such as when a corporation
is trying to circumvent the law."
Nevertheless, the opinion is a milestone in the development of
the corporate attorney-client privilege and gives some explana-
tion of the rationale for the privilege. As one commentator
states, the Court in Upjohn "utilized a functional mode of analy-
sis.., it asked whether the application of the privilege in cir-
cumstances of the kind at issue would enhance the flow of infor-
mation to corporate counsel regarding issues about which corpo-
rations seek legal advice." 35 The Court answered that question
in the affirmative and further grounded the corporate attorney-
client privilege in precedent, making a small step toward defin-
ing when the privilege would cover some conversations within a
corporation.
Although the Court has grappled with the issue of which
employees are covered by the corporate attorney-client privi-
lege, it has never addressed when the privilege should cover
an attorney's mixed business and legal advice. The privilege
has not been extended to any member of the bar who doles out
ment). Chief Justice Burger recommended that the privilege apply when an attorney
is authorized by management to inquire into a subject and the information is sought
to help: (1) evaluate whether the employee's conduct has or would bind the corpora-
tion, (2) assess the legal consequences, if any, of that conduct, or (3) formulate ap-
propriate legal responses to actions that have been or may be taken by others with
regard to that conduct. See id. (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
132. See Waldman, supra note 51, at 491-93 (complaining that the Court did not
address the Radiant Burner rationale for limiting the privilege and further criticizing
the Court for (1) making "no attempt to justify its primary assumption that the at-
torney-client privilege should apply in the corporate context" and (2) ignoring the
costs to society of extending the attorney-client privilege to corporations).
133. See Sexton, supra note 34, at 471.
134. See id.
135. Id. at 462.
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business advice; courts have consistently denied the attorney-
client-privilege protection's to such nonlegal communica-
tions."3 6 Courts, however, are less adept at deciding when
mixed business and legal advice should receive the privilege's
protections.137 As one commentator noted, courts "are unable
to discern whether the lawyer's role was solely, predominantly,
or marginally for legal purposes.""8 Part of the courts' diffi-
culty is that almost every transaction a corporation engages in,
from personnel changes to creating complex commercial agree-
ments, has some legal ramifications.'39
Applying the attorney-client privilege in the corporate setting
creates several problems. First, what is legal advice? Rice notes
that the following two factors have been considered indicative:
(1) interpretation and application of legal principles to specific
facts in order to guide future conduct and (2) performance of the
type of services that the attorney's education and certification
qualify him to render for compensation. 40 Nevertheless, to
gain the privilege's protection an attorney need not prove that
the task could not have been accomplished easily by a nonlaw-
yer 141 or that the task was completed in anticipation of litiga-
tion.'42 Rice notes that "beyond these generalities" the "law
provides no standards... for distinguishing legal advice from
nonlegal advice."43
136. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, §§ 2300-312.
137. See Giesel, supra note 16, at 1171; Waldman, supra note 51, at 494.
138. Waldman, supra note 51, at 494.
139. See id.
140. See RICE, supra note 5, § 7:9.
141. See, e.g., Attorney General v. Covington & Burling, 430 F. Supp. 1117, 1121
(D.D.C. 1977); Chore-Time Equip., Inc. v. Big Dutchman, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 1020,
1023 (W.D. Mich. 1966); see also Ellis-Foster Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,
159 F. Supp. 917, 920 (D.N.J. 1958) (considering a nonlawyer's ability to perform the
task as a factor, but not as a requirement for the application of the privilege).
142. See Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 862
(D.C. Cir. 1980) ("The privilege is not limited to communications made in the con-
text of litigation or even a specific dispute, but extends to all situations in which an
attorney's counsel is sought on a legal matter.").
143. RICE, supra note 5, § 7:9, at 522. Part of the problem with defining "legal ad-
vice" is that courts' attempts to do so provide little practical guidance. For instance,
a less-than-insightful federal district judge opined that legal advice requires the "in-
volve[ment of] the judgment of a lawyer in his capacity as a lawyer." Ball v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., No. M8-85(RWS), 1989 WL 135903, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
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United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,' 4 a seminal
decision on the breadth of the attorney-client privilege in the
realm of corporate transactions, gave an indication that courts
would review sympathetically the plight of the attorney provid-
ing mixed legal and business advice.'45 The court stated:
The modern lawyer almost invariably advises his client upon
not only what is permissible but also what is desirable. And
it is in the public interest that the lawyer should regard him-
self as more than predicter of legal consequences. His duty to
society as well as to his client involves many relevant social,
economic, political and philosophical considerations. And the
privilege of nondisclosure is not lost merely because relevant
nonlegal considerations are expressly stated in a communi-
cation which also includes legal advice.'"
Additionally, the fact that a document or communication con-
tains nonprivileged, nonlegal information will not, in and of it-
self, destroy the privilege. 47 In the area of tax advice, many
courts accept that a measure of business advice is inherent in
the protected legal communication."' For example, the court in
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated September 15, 1983 v.
United States' protected an outside law firm's tax advice con-
cerning "the mechanics and consequences of alternative business
strategies."5 °
Courts have also accepted that patent lawyers must dispense
both legal and nonlegal advice.'' Because patent lawyers nec-
essarily must assess the business impact of a company's patent
positions, the patent attorney's communications often involve
discussion of the company's market position, marketing strate-
Nov. 8, 1989). For a discussion of the problem of determining what is legal advice
in the corporate context, see Giesel, supra note 16.
144. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
145. See id. at 359.
146. Id.
147. See Spectrum Sys. Int'l Corp. v. Chemical Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1055, 1060
(N.Y. 1991).
148. See RICE, supra note 5, § 7:24.
149. 731 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1984).
150. Id. at 1038.
151. See RICE, supra note 5, § 7:5; Giesel, supra note 16, at 1214-15.
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gies, and licensing policies.152 Furthermore, patent attorneys
often draw upon their extensive scientific knowledge in their
work.153 Although these business and scientific considerations
are part of the patent attorney's discourse, they do not vitiate
the privilege."5 One court, applying the attorney-client privi-
lege to a patent attorney, stated:
Where a lawyer possesses multifarious talents, his clients
should not be deprived of the attorney-client privilege, where
applicable, simply because their correspondence is also con-
cerned with highly technical matters. Patent lawyers should
not be banished to the status of quasi-lawyers by reason of
the fact that besides being skilled in the law, they are also
competent in scientific and technical areas.'55
As can be seen from the tax and patent context, courts have tol-
erated a mixture of legal and business advice without eliminat-
ing the protections of the attorney-client privilege.
Afler determining that a communication may contain some
business advice, courts must determine how much business ad-
vice will be allowed. The most prevalent test used by courts is
the "predominant purpose" test, which protects a communication
if its predominant purpose was to provide legal advice.'56
Courts, unfortunately, have failed to identify the precise degree
of legal advice necessary to satisfy this test.
A final problem in applying the attorney-client privilege is
determining who in the corporation can assert its protections:
shareholders, the board of directors, upper-level management,
line-employees, or suppliers? In Garner v. Wolfinbarger,157 the
152. See RICE, supra note 5, § 7:5.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. Chore-Time Equip., Inc. v. Big Dutchman, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 1020, 1023 (W.D.
Mich. 1966).
156. See In re Subpoena to Ford Aerospace & Communications Corp., 27 Fed. R.
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 402, 404 (E.D. Pa. 1979); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D.
508, 517 (D. Conn. 1976); United States v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 66
F.R.D. 206, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 540 N.E.2d 703
(N.Y. 1989); Montebello Rose Co., Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 173 Cal.
Rptr. 856, 873-74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
157. 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970).
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Fifth Circuit held that in a shareholder derivative suit, corpo-
rate management could invoke the attorney-client privilege
against its own shareholders, the owners of the corporation.'58
The court, however, held that the shareholders could overcome
the privilege by presenting evidence of "good cause" and listed
nine factors that indicated when "good cause" existed.'59 Unfor-
tunately, courts have not applied the good cause, or Garner, ex-
ception either consistently or predictably. 6 ° Even if a corporate
officer has a legitimate reason to consult an attorney, the unpre-
dictability of the Garner exception is another factor inducing the
officer to pause before seeking legal advice, a decision that may
have disastrous implications for the corporation and possibly
detrimental consequences for society. This problem is particular-
ly apparent in the negotiation context.
THE ATTORNEY-NEGOTIATOR 6'
An attorney moves through three phases during a negotiation.
The attorney first gathers information about the negotiation, i.e.,
he identifies the party's true interest and the critical problems
158. See id. at 1103-04.
159. See id. at 1104. The nine factors identified by the Fifth Circuit are:
[1] the number of shareholders [requesting allegedly privileged communi-
cations] and the percentage of stock they represent; [2] the bona fides of
the shareholders; [3] the nature of the shareholders' claim and whether it
is obviously colorable; [4] the apparent necessity or desirability of the
shareholders having the information and the availability of it from other
sources; [51 whether, if the shareholder's claim is of wrongful action by
the corporation, [such] action [is] criminal, or illegal but not criminal, or
of doubtful legality; [6] whether the communication related to past or to
prospective actions; [71 whether the communication is of advice con-
cerning the litigation itself; [8] the extent to which the communication is
identified versus the extent to which the shareholders are blindly fishing;
[91 the risk of revelation of trade secrets or other information in whose
confidentiality the corporation has an interest for independent reasons.
Id.
160. See Robert R. Summerhays, The Problematic Expansion of the Garner v.
Wolfinbarger Exception to the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 31 TULSA L.J. 275,
317 (1995).
161. The attorney-negotiator, as discussed in this Note, refers to the attorney who
represents his client in negotiations with other corporations or with government
agencies.
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in the dispute."2 These activities are similar to the gathering
of information in an internal investigation or asking a client the
basic facts before initiating a lawsuit. As the Court stated in
Upjohn: "The first step in the resolution of any legal problem is
ascertaining the factual background and sifting through the
facts with an eye to the legally relevant."" In the information-
gathering and issue-identifying phase of the negotiations, the
attorney has a strong case that the attorney-client privilege
should apply.
In the second phase, the attorney conducts the negotiation.
During the negotiation the attorney's role is largely ministerial.
Any communications that occur with the client at the negotiat-
ing table are not covered by the privilege because they are not
confidential."M Nor does the privilege cover discussions be-
tween opposing parties because these communications are not
confidential client communications. This phase is most analo-
gous to a trial, and the attorney's claim to the privilege in this
phase is the weakest, if it exists at all.
In the third and final phase, the attorney must weigh options
with the client either during the negotiations or upon a proposed
settlement. The attorney-client communications in this phase
are analogous to a trial attorney's discussions with a client
about the trial proceedings. The types of activities that occur in
this context range from a discussion of the client's options to the
drafting of settlement documents. If the matters discussed dur-
ing the negotiating process or discussions of the negotiated com-
promise involve legal matters, then the attorney-client privilege
should apply.'65
162. See JAMES C. FREUND, SMART NEGOTIATING 98-111 (1993).
163. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390-91 (1981).
164. See Note Funding Corp. v. Bobian Inv. Co., N.V., No. 93 CIV. 7427 (DAB),
1995 WL 662402, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1995) (holding that the "reporting of devel-
opments in negotiations, if divorced from legal advice, is not protected by the privi-
lege under New York law"); Don't Be Underprivileged! Protect Yourself, ENVTL. COM-
PLIANCE & LITIG. STRATEGY, Oct. 1996, at 6.
165. Cf. FREUND, supra note 162, at 178-80 (putting forth a spectrum of negotiation
situations, ranging from issues in which the negotiating agent has expertise, i.e., le-
gal issues, to issues in which the negotiator has no expertise, i.e., "essentially busi-
ness judgments").
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Of the three phases, the communications during the negotia-
tion phase are least likely to merit the protections of the attorney-
client privilege. The first and third phases, involving gathering
information and explaining alternatives to the client, however,
are the more appropriate contexts in which to apply the privilege.
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE APPLIED TO THE ATTORNEY-
NEGOTIATOR
Only a limited number of cases have applied the attorney-client
privilege to the attorney-negotiator. Unfortunately, many of these
decisions contain only limited descriptions of the transactions
involved and provide limited analysis of why the privilege was
denied or granted to a particular communication.166 The pre-
Upjohn decisions generally denied the privilege to the attorney-
negotiator's communications, but these decisions did not explain
the level of legal discussion involved in the communications."
Two recent cases provided more enlightening discussions of
the privilege's application to the attorney-negotiator. In Diversey
U.S. Holdings, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., Diversey sought the
disclosure of four documents sent by Sara Lee executives to
counsel who were negotiating on Sara Lee's behalf.69 The con-
troversy concerned whether Sara Lee or Diversey was responsi-
ble under a Stock Purchase Agreement (SPA) for remediating
the environmental contamination at a site owned by a company
166. Three pre-Upjohn cases briefly discuss the attorney-negotiator but provide little
guidance. See Montebello Rose Co., Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 173 Cal.
Rptr. 856, 873-74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (reserving the privilege for those communica-
tions whose "dominant purpose" was to secure or render legal advice and finding
that evidence of the corporation's reaction to the union's petition for extension of
certification "appears to fall within the attorney-client privilege"); Gallagher v. Akoff
Realty Corp., 95 N.Y.S.2d 796, 797 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950) (suggesting that an attorney
who negotiated a real estate transaction could still be questioned on behalf of the
corporation if he had not left the company's employ); Myles E. Rieser Co. v. Loew's,
Inc., 81 N.Y.S. 2d 861, 862 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948) (holding that counsel "acted as ne-
gotiators in seeking to bring about agreement on the sundry details necessarily in-
volved in consummating a transaction of considerable size," and denying the privi-
lege in part because "only some of the letters concerned themselves with matters le-
gal") (emphasis added).
167. See discussion supra note 166.
168. No. 91 C 6234, 1994 WL 71462, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 1994).
169. See id. at *1.
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jointly held by Sara Lee and Diversey.7 ° The parties disputed
the meaning of an SPA provision."' The four documents
sought by Diversey concerned the interpretation of the disputed
contract provision by Sara Lee executives during the negotiation
of the SPA.
Diversey claimed that the attorneys 73 acted in a business
capacity and that the documents should not be covered by the
privilege. 74 Additionally, Diversey claimed that Sara Lee was
not "seeking legal advice" from the attorneys. 76 Sara Lee had
enlisted its attorneys to negotiate the contract language imple-
menting an agreement in principle already reached by the exec-
utives of Diversey and Sara Lee.'76 The attorneys sent drafts of
the contract to various officers of the company to solicit their
concerns about how the contract language would affect matters
under the officers' control.'77 The documents at issue in
Diversey discussed the potential problems identified by the cor-
porate officers regarding the proposed contract.'78
The court ordered Sara Lee to disclose the documents because
Sara Lee had waived the attorney-client privilege.'79 Neverthe-
less, the court found that before the waiver the communications
in the four documents were privileged. The court noted: "This
strikes us as the gathering of information by an attorney from
the client to enable the attorney to provide competent legal ser-
vices-in this case, the drafting of a contract."8 ° The court ap-
plied the privilege to those documents because "[d]raffing legal
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. The opinion does not make clear whether the attorneys were in-house counsel
or outside counsel.
174. See Diversey, 1994 WL 71462, at *1.
175. Id. at *2.
176. See id. at *1.
177. See id& at *2.
178. See id. at *1.
179. The court found that the corporation voluntarily had disclosed information pro-
tected by the attorney-cient privilege involving the same subject matter as the four
documents. See id. at *2. The court held that the corporation had waived the privilege
because it had disclosed information about earlier drafts of the contract and that the
earlier drafts constituted the same subject matter as the later drafts. See id.
180. Id. at *1.
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documents is a core activity of lawyers, and obtaining informa-
tion and feedback from clients is a necessary part of the pro-
cess." 8' Additionally, the court held that the corporate execu-
tives were "seeking legal advice" because Sara Lee was "identify-
ing to the attorneys certain concerns that it wanted the contract
language to address." 8' The court's analysis tracked the analy-
sis of the Court in Upjohn, applying the attorney-client privilege
to the gathering of information for the dispensing of legal ad-
vice." The court in Diversey simply applied the Upjohn ratio-
nale in the attorney-negotiator context, recognizing that attor-
ney-negotiators often dispense legal advice.
In Note Funding Corp. v. Bobian Investment Co.,' the court
conducted a detailed and thorough analysis regarding whether
the privilege applied to documents compiled during the negotia-
tion of a complex commercial transaction." The court recog-
nized that in "large and complex financial transactions" corpora-
tions naturally seek "the assistance of attorneys who are well
equipped both by training and by experience to assess the risks
and advantages in alternative business strategies."'86 To effec-
tively serve their clients, these attorney-negotiators
will often be required to assess specific tactics in putting to-
gether transactions or shaping the terms of commercial
agreements, and their evaluation of alternative approaches
may well take into account not only the potential impact of
applicable legal norms, but also the commercial needs of their
client and the financial benefits or risks of these alternative
strategies. 87
The court reasoned that "[ilf the attorney's advice is sought, at
least in part, because of his legal expertise and the advice rests
'predominantly' on his assessment of the requirements imposed,
181. Id.
182. Id. at *2.
183. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390-91 (1981); Diversey, 1994
WL 71462, at *1-*2.
184. No. 93 CIV. 7427 (DAB), 1995 WL 662402 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1995).
185. See id. at *1-*3.
186. Id. at *2.
187. Id.
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or the opportunities offered, by applicable rules of law, he is per-
forming the function of a lawyer."" The court then separately
analyzed the documents in question, denying the privilege to
those that primarily dealt with the "calculus of business consid-
erations" and extending the privilege to those that "at least in
part" involved legal judgments, i.e., a judgment "depend[ing]
principally on [the attorney's] knowledge of or application of le-
gal requirements or principles."'89
The Note Funding decision demonstrates that thoughtful,
painstaking analysis is needed to apply the "predominant pur-
pose" test properly. The opinion, however, did not apply that test
narrowly-the court extended the privilege to documents that
contained "extensive discussions of financial questions and is-
sues of commercial strategy and tactics" so long as they were
made "with an obvious eye to the constraints imposed by appli-
cable law."
90
Courts have neither categorically rejected nor applied the
privilege to an attorney-negotiator. As Rice states: "Negotiation
services provided by an attorney are neither inherently legal nor
nonlegal. The nature of the negotiations turns on their subject
matter and their relationship to other services provided to the
client." 9' In order to make that determination, the current
predominant purpose test requires -courts to engage in a de-
tailed, protracted analysis of the business and legal aspects of
the communications to determine whether the privilege applies.
THE GEORGIA-PACIFIC CASE
Unfortunately, the predominant purpose test has not been
uniformly applied.' Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. GAF Roofing
Manufacturing Corp.' highlights the practical problems with
applying the standard to a complex negotiation. The decision
also demonstrates that the time has come to reformulate the
188. Id. at *3 (emphasis added).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. RICE, supra note 5, § 7:22, at 541.
192. See Giesel, supra note 16, at 1202.
193. No. 93 Civ. 5125 (RPP), 1996 WL 29392 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1996).
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standard to provide greater certainty and to better serve the
principles of the attorney-client privilege.
Georgia-Pacific arose out of a breach of contract claim brought
by Georgia-Pacific against GAF."94 Under the contested con-
tract, GAF bought properties and other assets related to Geor-
gia-Pacific's roofing business.9 ' After a dispute regarding
Georgia-Pacific's responsibility to remediate one of the proper-
ties, Georgia-Pacific sued GAF.'96 Georgia-Pacific requested
that the court compel Michael D. Scott, in-house environmental
counsel for GAF, to answer certain deposition questions.'97
Scott's involvement in the negotiations began in January or
February of 1993 when GAF requested that he review a pro-
posed asset purchase agreement and comment on the environ-
mental issues raised by the proposal.'98 Scott feared that the
proposed agreement did not cover certain types of claims that
would arise in an environmental audit and that some provisions
of the contract were "unusual" in nature.9 9 He suggested ways
to negotiate the agreement to a senior executive at GAF and to
the other GAF in-house counsel."' Scott subsequently negoti-
ated the environmental issues related to the transaction for GAF
and was present at the execution of the agreement.2 '
The agreement required GAF to conduct an environmental
audit of the properties and to propose additional properties that
Georgia-Pacific would agree to remediate and for which Georgia-
Pacific would assume liability.0 2 After the audit, Scott request-
ed that Georgia-Pacific agree that an issue relating to the detec-
tion of trichloroethylene, a hazardous substance present at one
of the properties, be "carved out" from the environmental agree-
ment.2 3 Scott advanced GAF's position that either the "carve
out" provision or "straight indemnification" should be used to
194. See id. at *1.
195. See id.
196. See id. at *2.
197. See id. at *1.
198. See id.
199. Id.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. Id. at *2.
1424
IN-HOUSE ATORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
eliminate this asset purchase problem for GAF.2 Georgia-Pa-
cific, however, opposed both of these alternatives.0 5 Although
preliminary investigations were undertaken by Scott, GAF can-
celed the agreement before negotiations could resolve the is-
sue."6 Georgia-Pacific subsequently filed suit.0 '
Georgia-Pacific requested that Mr. Scott answer three questions:
1. What recommendations, if any, did Mr. Scott make to the
GAF negotiators of the Agreement in February-March 1993
as to how the provisions of the proposed agreement could be
changed and the impact of such changes on the proposed pro-
visions.
2. Whether, after his June 7, 1993 meeting with [Georgia-Pa-
cific], Mr. Scott made a recommendation to anyone in GAF's
senior management that they should consider options other
than "straight indemnification" or "carve out" as a negotiat-
ing strategy.
3. Whether [a senior executive at GAF] asked Mr. Scott to
cancel Mr. Scott's planned meeting for July 19 or July 20,
1993 with [a Georgia-Pacific environmental lawyer].
The court compelled Scott to answer question three, regarding
whether he was told to cancel the meeting, and requested coun-
sel to submit briefs on the issue of whether Mr. Scott should be
compelled to answer the first two questions.09
As a diversity case governed by New York law, the court in
Georgia-Pacific relied heavily on Note Funding and the New
York Court of Appeals' decision in Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield.2 0 Given the Georgia-Pacific court's reliance on Rossi, a
brief discussion of the case is warranted.2 '
204. Id.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. Id. at *2-*3 (citations omitted).
209. See id. at *3.
210. 540 N.E.2d 703 (N.Y. 1989).
211. Note Funding was discussed previously. See supra notes 184-90 and accom-
panying text.
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The dispute in Rossi concerned an internal memorandum sent
by the defendant's in-house counsel to corporate officers and di-
rectors in response to a defamation complaint." The defen-
dant, Blue Cross & Blue Shield, sent notices to 2000 of the phy-
sician-plaintiffs patients rejecting the patients' claims for reim-
bursement for a medical procedure that was allegedly "experi-
mental or whose effectiveness is not generally recognized by an
appropriate government agency." 11 The procedure, however,
had been approved by the Food and Drug Administration's Na-
tional Center for Devices and Radiological Health. 4 The phy-
sician-plaintiff sued for defamation. 15 On the day the com-
plaint arrived, a Blue Cross staff counsel wrote the memoran-
dum at issue, which discussed a conversation between the attor-
ney and opposing counsel, the plaintiffs medical procedure, Blue
Cross's reimbursement policy, and the attorney's opinion and
advice about the notices' rejection language."' The plaintiff re-
quested a copy of the memorandum, and Blue Cross claimed
that the attorney-client privilege protected the document.217
The New York Court of Appeals agreed with Blue Cross.218
Acknowledging that the attorney-client privilege applied to the
in-house counsel, the court warned that it would still "apply [the
privilege] cautiously and narrowly."1 9 Although "no ready test
exist[ed] for distinguishing between protected legal communica-
tions and unprotected business or personal communications," the
court used several "guideposts" to determine whether the privi-
lege should apply.220 The court found persuasive that (1) the
memorandum was an internal, confidential document and (2)
"there is no dispute as to the author's status or role. [The in-
house counsel] functioned as a lawyer, and solely as a lawyer,
for defendant client."22 Additionally, the court observed that
212. See Rossi, 540 N.E.2d at 703-04.
213. Id. at 704.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 703-04.
219. Id. at 705.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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communications concerning the context of imminent litigation
"generally will fall into the area of legal rather than business or
personal matters."222 The court, nevertheless, observed that the
"privilege is not lost merely by reason of the fact that it also re-
fers to certain nonlegal matters."2' The court's primary con-
cern was whether the predominant purpose of the communica-
tion concerned legal matters." The court concluded that Blue
Cross's attorney was "exercising a lawyer's traditional function
in counseling his client regarding conduct that had already
brought it to the brink of litigation."2
The Georgia-Pacific court appears to have taken Rossi's
"guideposts" and turned them into requirements, unnecessarily
restricting the attorney-client privilege. Echoing the New York
Court of Appeals in Rossi, the court in Georgia-Pacific stated
that the need to apply the privilege "cautiously and narrowly" is
more acute in the case of in-house counsel, "lest the mere partic-
ipation of an attorney be used to seal off disclosure."226 The
court held that the privilege did not protect communications that
"expressed substantial non-legal concerns " M and that were not
given by a lawyer "exercising a lawyer's traditional
function."' The court, however, did not address specifically
whether serving as a negotiator is a traditional legal function.
The court found that because the advice given by Scott was
"not in the context of imminent litigation" and "[s]ince Mr. Scott
negotiated the environmental terms of the Agreement,"229 the
privilege did not apply, and Georgia-Pacific was "entitled to
know what environmental matters he determined would not be
covered in the proposed agreement."" ° The court dismissed
Scott's averment that he was rendering legal advice by noting
222. Id. at 706.
223. Id.
224. See id.
225. Id.
226. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. GAF Roofing Mfg. Corp., No. 93 Civ. 5125 (RPP) 1996
WL 29392, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1996).
227. Id. (quoting Cooper-Rutter Assocs. v. Anchor Nat'1 Life Ins. Co., 563 N.Y.S.2d
491, 492 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)).
228. Id (quoting Rossi, 540 N.E.2d at 706).
229. Id. at *5.
230. Id.
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that his argument "although considered, does not overcome the
nature of his role in the transaction.""' The court concluded
that "lilt seems clear Mr. Scott acted as a negotiator... and
that his conversation... as regards the status of the negotia-
tions, the tradeoffs that Mr. Scott perceived [Georgia-Pacific]
was willing to make, and GAF's options, involved business judg-
ments of environmental risks." 2
The Georgia-Pacific decision, at best, narrowly read Rossi's
predominant purpose test and, at worst, was so blinded by
Scott's "role" as a negotiator that it failed to analyze whether
the communications between Scott and his employer were pri-
marily legal in character. The court appears to have turned
Rossi's guideposts into requirements, making errors in law that
undermine the attorney-client privilege. Rossi's "guideposts" are
themselves dangerous and inexact proxies for determining
whether the privilege should apply-as shown by the Georgia-
Pacific case.
First, the attorney need not act "solely as a lawyer" for the
attorney-client privilege to apply to a communication.23 As the
court noted in Rossi, the role performed by the attorney may
increase the likelihood that the communication concerns legal
matters, but that is not the end of the inquiry.' Georgia-Pa-
cific failed to recognize that an attorney not acting solely as an
attorney can still engage in communications deserving the
protections of the attorney-client privilegeY. 5 In fact, the court
stated explicitly that the privilege would not apply to any of the
legal advice given by Scott because of "the nature of his role in
the transaction."25 Georgia-Pacific's, and to a lesser extent
Rossi's, overemphasis on the "role" of an attorney encourages
future courts to rely on an attorney's position on an organiza-
tional chart when deciding whether to apply the privilege rather
231. Id. (emphasis added).
232. Id.
233. See RICE, supra note 5, § 7:9.
234. See Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 540 N.E.2d 703, 705-06 (N.Y. 1989).
235. See Note Funding Corp. v. Bobian Inv. Co., No. CIV. 7427 (DAB), 1995 WL
662402, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1995); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89
F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950).
236. Georgia-Pacific, 1996 WL 29392 at *5.
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than focusing on whether the communication was the type of
legal discussion that the privilege should protect.
Second, the court in Rossi mentioned the lawyer's traditional
role as a "guidepost" to determining whether a communication is
privileged, but the gravamen of the decision was whether the
"communication is primarily or predominantly of a legal charac-
ter." 7 The attorney's function may have some relevance, but
the cardinal consideration is the content of the communication.
An attorney performing a nontraditional function may discuss
nonlegal matters in his communications, but so may an attorney
performing a traditional function." s Moreover, courts have
held since United Shoe and as recently as Note Funding that a
protected communication can, and often must, contain substan-
tial nonlegal discussions. 9 Prior cases focused on whether the
attorney was rendering legal advice, not on the attorney's
"role.-2 °
Third, whether the advice was given in the context of immi-
nent litigation has not been a dispositive factor for the applica-
tion of the attorney-client privilege." The Georgia-Pacific deci-
sion rejected the privilege partly because "Mr. Scott's discussion
with management concerning these issues was prior to the
Agreement being entered into and not in the context of immi-
nent litigation." 2 Although imminence of litigation is neces-
sary for the work product doctrine,'3litigation need not be im-
237. Rossi, 540 N.E.2d at 706.
238. See supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text (discussing application of the
attorney-client privilege to patent attorneys).
239. See Note Funding, 1995 WL 662402, at *3 ("The fact that an attorney's advice
encompasses commercial as well as legal considerations does not vitiate the privi-
lege."); United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 359.
240. See e.g., Note Funding, 1995 WL 662402, at *1; Diversey U.S. Holdings, Inc.
v. Sara Lee Corp., No. 91 C 6234, 1994 WL 71462, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 1994);
United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 359; Spectrum Sys. Inl Corp. v. Chemical Bank, 581
N.E.2d 1055, 1061 (N.Y. 1991); GERGACZ, supra note 28, 3.02[21[a[iv].
241. See Spectrum Sys., 581 N.E.2d at 1061 (rejecting the requirement that to receive
the protections of the privilege the advice must be given in the context of imminent
litigation); GERGACZ, supra note 28, 3.02121[a][iv]; Berke, supra note 19, at 5.
242. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. GAF Roofing Mfg. Corp., No. 93 Civ. 5125 (RPP), 1996
WL 29392, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1996).
243. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-12 (1947).
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minent for the attorney-client privilege to apply.' Imminence
of litigation was one of Rossi's guideposts, 5 but has never
been a requirement. In addition, by suggesting that the privilege
did not protect Scott's discussion because the discussion occurred
before an agreement was reached,"5 the court ignored that in-
house counsel provide their greatest service during the creation
of legal rights and responsibilities." Denying the privilege in
the formation of legal duties unnecessarily restricts the privilege
at this critical phase.
Finally, the court misapplied the predominant purpose test to
Scott's discussions. The court found that the discussion of envi-
ronmental risks involved a business judgment, not a legal judg-
ment.m Yet, as one commentator on the case states: "environ-
mental risks almost by definition include the potential for litiga-
tion with third parties or the government." 9 Much like commu-
nications involving patent and tax advice,20 an attorney advising
a client about environmental problems in most instances will, of
necessity, discuss complicated legal matters, even if the commu-
nications also involve business considerations."' Scott did pro-
vide mixed business and legal advice, but the Georgia-Pacific anal-
ysis appears to have placed form over substance by denying the
privilege to an in-house attorney who served a dual role as a nego-
tiator and counselor but still dispensed significant legal advice.
Moreover, the focus of the Rossi and Georgia-Pacific courts on
the "lawyer's traditional role" provides little guidance for future
courts and threatens to restrict the evolution of the attorney-cli-
ent privilege to the mores of the seventeenth-century Inns of
Court. Courts should not restrict the privilege to the "traditional
functions" of an attorney because this would confine the privilege
to a narrow set of activities. The services provided by attorneys
are changing constantly, with attorneys performing functions in
244. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
245. See Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 540 N.E.2d 703, 706 (N.Y. 1989).
246. See Georgia-Pacific, 1996 WL 29392, at *4-*5.
247. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
248. See Georgia-Pacific, 1996 WL 29392, at *5.
249. Berke, supra note 19, at 6.
250. See supra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
251. See Berke, supra note 19, at 6.
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legal contexts that were never imagined. For example, a funda-
mental skill of a modern attorney is the ability to manipulate an
electronic database to conduct research. A court obsessed with the
traditional role of an attorney might find that the use of comput-
ers was not part of the attorney's function-a foolhardy result.
Likewise, if courts restrict the privilege to the performance of
traditional functions, then communications made as part of many
new and innovative legal services may be exposed to the dangers
of the discovery process. This outcome might prevent potential
clients from turning to attorneys for legal advice, undermining an
important justification for the attorney-client privilege: encourag-
ing clients to seek legal adviceY2
Nevertheless, the functions of a negotiator are part of the
lawyer's traditional function. Indeed, the Court in Diversey
found that drafting documents, a vital part of negotiating a com-
mercial agreement, "is a core activity of lawyers, and obtaining
information and feedback from clients is a necessary part of the
process."" Additionally, one of the matters the Georgia-Pacific
court forced Scott to disclose, his discussion of the possible posi-
tions GAF could take in the negotiations,' involved a tradi-
tional function. As the New York Court of Appeals stated in
Spectrum Systems: "]egal advice often begins-and may
end-with a preliminary evaluation and a range of options."255
Advising clients about the range of opportunities available, espe-
cially in the complex universe of environmental liability, is a
part of the lawyer's traditional roleY Although not recognized
by the Georgia-Pacific court, both drafting documents and advis-
ing clients about the range of potential options in a legal context
are crucial parts of negotiating commercial contracts and part of
a lawyer's traditional function."
252. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
253. Diversey U.S. Holdings, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., No. 91 C 6234, 1994 WL
71462, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 1994).
254. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. GAF Roofing Mfg. Corp., No. 93 Civ. 5125 (RPP),
1996 WL 29392, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1996).
255. Spectrum Sys. Int'l Corp. v. Chemical Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1055, 1061 (N.Y.
1991); see also Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390-91 ("The first step in the resolution of any
legal problem is ascertaining the factual background and shifting though the facts
with an eye to the legally relevant.").
256. See Berke, supra note 19, at 6.
257. Professor Giesel argues:
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Georgia-Pacific's departure from precedent prompted a flurry
of commentary lamenting the further restriction of the attorney-
client privilege for in-house counsel."6 The case heightened in-
house counsels' concerns that their communications are under
increased attack"9 and spurred business writers to question
whether it would be wiser to send such work outside the corpo-
ration.26 Some also suggested that the attorney-client privilege
would have applied if the attorney-negotiator was an outside
attorney.26' Most commentators agreed that the "broad scope of
the denial" "' posed a particular threat to in-house counsel,
more so than other recent cases that have narrowed the privi-
lege.263 One commentator claimed that Georgia-Pacific "single-
handedly decimated the attorney-client privilege for communica-
tions between in-house counsel and management during contract
negotiations."2" Additionally, some argued that the decision,
far from making the application of the privilege more certain,
would require corporations to spend more money on legal advice
to determine whether the advice they received from their in-
house counsel was "legal advice."2"
As some of the press reports noted, the traditional analysis of
whether the attorney-client privilege applies to a mixed busi-
ness/legal communication does not focus on buzz phrases such as
"lawyer's traditional role" or on the "role" played by the attor-
ney.266 As Gergacz states:
[Niegotiating and drafting contracts for clients may not have been a tra-
ditional function for attorneys. In the latter part of the twentieth centu-
ry, attorneys frequently negotiate and draft contracts for clients and use
legal expertise and training in doing so. Courts should not deny the priv-
ilege to client disclosures to obtain such lawyer services simply because
the services rendered do not resemble litigation assistance or work typi-
cally done by an attorney in 1900 or even 1950.
Giesel, supra note 16, at 1195 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
258. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
259. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 1, at 49; MacLachlan, supra note 19, at B1.
260. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 1, at 49.
261. See, e.g., id.
262. MacLachlan, supra note 19, at B1.
263. See id.; Berke, supra note 19, at 5.
264. Berke, supra note 19, at 5.
265. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 1, at 49.
266. See, e.g., Berke, supra note 19, at 6.
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The focus of the inquiry should be on the function that the
lawyer is predominantly performing: applying law to a set of
facts, reviewing client conduct based on the effect of laws or
regulations, advising the client about status or trends in the
law, and other similar lawyer-related tasks.2"
This standard is not easy to apply." The court in Georgia-
Pacific relied on imprecise phrases such as the "lawyer's tradi-
tional role," imposing what appears to be a per se bar on the
application of the attorney-client privilege to the negotiator and
highlighting the problems with the current predominate purpose
test. The decision demonstrates that the time has come to re-
evaluate that test and to reexamine when to apply the attorney-
client privilege to the attorney-negotiator to best achieve the
goals of the privilege.
A NEW STANDARD FOR APPLYING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE TO THE ATTORNEY-NEGOTIATOR
The predominant purpose test has proven to be an unclear,
uncertain, and unworkable mechanism for determining when
the attorney-negotiator should receive the protections of the at-
torney-client privilege. Georgia-Pacific demonstrates the need for
a significant expansion of the attorney-client privilege to cover
the communications between in-house counsel and corporate
officers and directors in two contexts: (1) communications initiat-
ed before the commencement of negotiations that involve deter-
mining what the company's prenegotiation standing is and de-
termining what positions the company can and should take (the
"consultation phase"), and (2) communications between in-house
counsel and corporate officials during the negotiations that in-
volve discussions of the alternatives that the corporation can
and should pursue in light of negotiation developments (the "ne-
gotiation phase"). 6'
267. GERGACZ, supra note 28, 3.02[2][a][iv], at 3-23.
268. See Giesel, supra note 16, at 1202; Berke, supra note 19, at 6.
269. The expansion argued for in this Note would not include the actual discussions
during the negotiations nor reports on the bargaining positions taken by the negotiators.
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Wigmore articulated a balancing test to determine whether an
evidentiary privilege should be recognized.27 ° Although
Wigmore designed his balancing test to be used when deciding
whether to establish the existence of a privilege, this Note will
use the test to analyze an expansion of a privilege. According to
Wigmore, a court should recognize a privilege, and thus deny the
fact-finder information, if "[t]he injury that would inure to the
relation by the disclosure of the communications [is] greater
than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litiga-
tion."271 Under this standard, a court must weigh the costs and
benefits of the expansion, both to the individuals claiming the
privilege and to society at large.272 When Wigmore's balancing
test is applied to the attorney-negotiator, the benefits that would
accrue to society outweigh the harms.
First, applying the privilege to the consultation and negotia-
tion phases does not pose significant problems for the discovery
process. The privilege only protects communications not
facts." 3 An adversary likely could discover the range of options
considered by an in-house counsel through an examination of
the positions taken in the actual face-to-face negotiations, which
should remain unprotected. Not all of the information that the
fact-finder may desire, however, will be available through ex-
trapolation based on maneuvers at the negotiating table. This
small amount of lost information is the most obvious cost of
expanding the attorney-client privilege further.
Second, significant benefits accrue from expanding the privi-
lege. A broad privilege ensures that corporations continue to
consult and use lawyers in negotiations so that corporations can
avoid regulatory infractions and misunderstandings in commer-
cial transactions," both of which may lead to the use of al-
ready-strained judicial resources. In addition to problems for the
judicial system caused by corporations failing to seek attorneys'
270. See Summerhays, supra note 160, at 280.
271. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2285, at 527.
272. See id.; Summerhays, supra note 160, at 280 ("Wigmore believed that eviden-
tiary privileges should only be recognized if the benefits produced by the privileges
outweigh the associated costs from the loss of relevant evidence.").
273. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981).
274. See RICE, supra note 5, § 4:10.
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advice, corporations may also waste resources on litigation that
could have been prevented by competent legal advice received
during the negotiations. By encouraging in-house counsel to
practice preventive law,27 an expanded and more certain privi-
lege would provide societal benefits by conserving judicial and
corporate resources.
Third, preventive-law counsel from in-house counsel is more
economically efficient for the corporation because of the lower
costs of in-house counsel legal advice.276 Furthermore, in-house
counsel, given their institutional positions within the corpora-
tion, are often more successful at changing the behavior of their
clients than outside attorneys. 7 As one commentator observes:
[ln-house attorneys differ from outside corporate counsel in
that they have better access to the facts, their personal and
professional ties are to their client, and they are often asked
to make decisions, rather than give advice. Therefore in-
house counsel has greater ability to alter her client's behavior
and thus a corresponding duty to use that ability to promote
constructive behavior by the client.278
In-house counsel, therefore, are precisely the attorneys with
whom the law should encourage corporations to consult. For
both corporations and society, the use of in-house counsel should
be encouraged by the attorney-client privilege. The predominant
purpose test and its application in Georgia-Pacific, however, dis-
courages the use of in-house counsel.
Finally, encouraging corporate clients to seek the aid of in-
house counsel during negotiations is supported by the classic ra-
tionale of the attorney-client privilege: encouraging clients to
disclose information to their attorneys.2 79 Expanding the privi-
lege is in line with the rationale the Supreme Court used to jus-
275. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
276. See SPANGLER, supra note 4, at 71.
277. See Hill, supra note 66, at 186-89.
278. Corello, supra note 71, at 409 (citations omitted); see also Hill, supra note
66, at 188 ("[Iln-house counsel's unique position and early involvement in situa-
tions may make it even more likely that they can encourage lawful behavior by
their employers.").
279. See 8 WIGI,1ORE, supra note 9, § 2291.
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tify the privilege in Upjohn. As one commentator observes, the
Court in Upjohn applied the privilege because it found that "cir-
cumstances of the kind at issue would enhance the flow of infor-
mation to corporate counsel regarding issues about which corpo-
rations seek legal advice.""0 Expansion of the corporate attor-
ney-client privilege argued for by this Note would further en-
courage corporations to consult attorneys in the negotiation pro-
cess. This would increase the flow of information to in-house
counsel and allow them to provide better legal advice."5 Ab-
sent the protection of the privilege, corporations might fail to
consult in-house counsel or, possibly worse, seek legal advice
without providing the attorney with a complete understanding of
all the facts.
The benefits that follow from preserving judicial resources,
allowing in-house counsel to continue to provide efficient, effec-
tive legal services, and increasing the flow of information to in-
house counsel far outweigh the cost associated with denying a
limited amount of information to the fact-finder. Applying
Wigmore's classic balancing test to the attorney-negotiator, the
expansion of the privilege is justified.
When a court encounters a corporation claiming the attorney-
client privilege for an in-house counsel who has negotiated for
the corporation, the court should ask whether the communica-
tion contains a significant amount of legal advice. In answering
this question, the court should consider whether, in the commer-
cial context, the information impacts the formation of legal
rights and obligations or whether, in the regulatory context, the
information affects the determination of legally permissible be-
havior. Courts should still deny the protections of the privilege
to communications about the "calculus of business consider-
ations.""2 If the court finds that the communication impacts
legal rights and obligations, then the privilege should apply to
the communication. By lowering the amount of legal advice from
280. Sexton, supra note 34, at 462.
281. Cf. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981) (rejecting the con-
trol group test because it deprived in-house counsel of all relevant information and
encouraged inaccurate legal advice).
282. Note Funding Corp. v. Bobian Inv. Co., No. 93 CIV. 7427 (DAB), 1995 WL
662402, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1995).
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"predominant" to "significant," this new test would provide more
certainty because in-house counsel and judges should find it eas-
ier to determine if a discussion is "tainted" by legal advice as
opposed to being mainly or predominantly involving legal advice.
In essence, it would be easier for a judge to determine if twenty
percent of a discussion is about legal issues as opposed to deter-
mining whether forty-five percent or sixty percent of a discus-
sion involves legal advice.
When applying this new test, the presumption that in-house
counsel are not engaged in legal advice2" should be rebutted if
the attorney is negotiating a matter in which a lawyer's skills
would be particularly helpful. For example, negotiations involving
complex regulatory regimes, such as patent, tax, securities, and
environmental laws, are likely to involve significant legal advice
and are areas in which a presumption that the in-house counsel is
acting as an attorney is appropriate. Additionally, the
corporation's economic incentives will encourage it to use an at-
torney in situations in which a lawyer's skill is most needed as op-
posed to using a nonattorney, and this specialization should sig-
nal a legal discussion to courts. The economic pressure on the
corporation to use in-house counsel is an appropriate proxy for
courts to rely on to extend the privilege. Indeed, reliance on eco-
nomic incentives is not new to the law of evidence-this is the
same rationale behind the "Records of Regularly Conducted Ac-
tivity" exception to the hearsay rule under the Federal Rules of
Evidence.' Accordingly, corporations' economic incentives to
use in-house counsel as attorneys provide sufficient assurance to
warrant the presumption that the attorney-client privilege should
apply when attorneys discuss complex regulatory regimes.
Also, when applying the proposed "significant amount" test,
courts should jettison several indices relied upon in prior opin-
ions. First, courts should avoid discussions of a "lawyer's tradi-
tional function."2 This is an almost meaningless phrase in the
283. See In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
284. FED. R. EVID. 803(6) and advisory committee's note (relying on a corporation's
economic incentives to keep accurate business records as a basis for making an ex-
ception to the prohibition on hearsay).
285. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. GAF Roofing Mfg. Corp., No. 93 Civ. 5125 (RPP), 1996
WL 29392, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1996) (quoting Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue
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context of an ever-evolving, specialized corporate legal prac-
tice. The mores of the Inns of Court should not dictate what
communications deserve protecting in light of the utilitarian
benefits of the attorney-client privilege. If the privilege is to
retain its vitality, then it must adapt to changes in the prac-
tice of law."6
Furthermore, a court should not, as was done in Georgia-
Pacific,17 place weight on whether the advice was given in
the context of imminent litigation.2 8 Imminent litigation is a
requirement for application of the work-product doctrine"9
and can be a factor in the application of the attorney-client
privilege,29 but it is not a requirement of the privilege."'
In fact, the in-house counsel provides his most valuable legal
advice when practicing preventive law, the very purpose of
which is the avoidance of litigation. It is, thus, imperative
that the attorney-client privilege be available to in-house
counsel at a time far removed from imminent litigation: when
negotiations are forming legal relationships and duties.
Finally, a court should not be blinded by the "role" per-
formed by the attorney. Although relevant, the attorney's role
is not a proper proxy for application of the privilege.292 If
courts continue to overemphasize the attorney's role, then
they will issue more decisions that fail to actually investigate
what information was provided to the attorney, as occurred in
Georgia-Pacific.
Shield, 540 N.E.2d 703, 706 (N.Y. 1989)).
286. See Giesel, supra note 16, at 1195.
287. See Georgia.Pacific, 1996 WL 29392, at *4.
288. See Spectrum Sys. Int'l Corp. v. Chemical Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1055, 1061 (N.Y.
1991) (rejecting the requirement that to receive the protections of the privilege the
advice must be given in the context of imminent litigation); Berke, supra note 19, at 6.
289. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-12 (1947).
290. See Rossi, 540 N.E.2d at 705.
291. See id.
292. See supra notes 233-40 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
An uncertain privilege is a worthless privilege. 93 This Note
advocates changing the current test for applying the attorney-
client privilege in the attorney-negotiator context from the pre-
dominate purpose test to the significant amount test. The attor-
ney-client privilege's value to society is dependent on the ease
with which courts and attorneys can apply it.
2 4
The recent Georgia-Pacific decision highlighted a new area of
uncertainty with the attorney-client privilege: the attorney-nego-
tiator working for a corporation. Courts historically have been
hostile to in-house counsel,295 but these attorneys provide a
significant benefit to society by practicing preventive law. Con-
tract negotiation and settlement agreements by in-house counsel
can involve the dispensing of significant legal advice. The recent
application of the predominant purpose test in Georgia-Pacific,
however, did not provide the certainty needed to encourage cor-
porations to use in-house counsel in negotiations. Changing the
current test from a predominant purpose to a significant amount
inquiry would provide heightened certainty. By expanding the
privilege, in-house counsel would have a more certain under-
standing of what conversations are covered by the privilege. Cor-
porations thus would be more likely to consult in-house counsel.
By encouraging in-house counsel to practice preventive law in
negotiations, courts could conserve scarce judicial resources be-
cause the increased use of attorneys would avoid commercial
disputes and encourage compliance with the law. The benefits
that would accrue from the expansion of the privilege would far
outweigh the costs.
Mark C. Van Deusen
293. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
294. See Berke, supra note 19, at 6.
295. See Giesel, supra note 16, at 1203-15; Berke, supra note 19, at 6.
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